A Czech-language post on X claimed that a recent survey by the Polish firm IBRiS showed most Poles — 58.2% — do not believe in a Russian threat, and that only 3.8% firmly believe Russia will attack Poland, despite what the author called a "total media campaign." The numbers themselves check out. The survey was conducted by United Surveys by IBRiS for Wirtualna Polska and asked respondents: "Are you afraid that in the next few years Russia will attack Poland militarily?" Dorzeczy and TV Republika both reported the identical figures on October 2, 2026: 58.2% said they do not fear Russian aggression (39.1% "rather not," 19.1% "definitely not"), while 3.8% answered "definitely yes" and 20.7% "rather yes" — together 24.5% who see an attack as at least somewhat possible. Another 17.4% had no firm opinion.
So the core percentages in the post are accurate. But the framing adds layers the poll does not support. The question measured fear of a specific military attack in the coming years, not belief in the "Russian threat" as a broad concept — a distinction that matters, because hybrid threats, sabotage, and disinformation are part of the security discussion in Poland and are not covered by this single question. The post's phrase "despite a total media campaign" is editorial commentary; nothing in the polling coverage documents such a campaign, and the survey results say nothing about its existence or effectiveness.
The post also leaves out key context from the same data. Nearly one in four respondents (24.5%) do consider a Russian attack possible, and the share fearing an attack was markedly higher among voters of the ruling coalition (41%), women (25% in a related IBRiS poll for Rzeczpospolita), and people aged 50–59 (32%). That same Rzeczpospolita-commissioned IBRiS survey, reported by Forsal on October 3, used a different question — whether the war in Ukraine could spill into Poland — and found 77.1% answering "no," which is consistent with a general mood of skepticism but is a separate measurement.
In short, the post's headline figures are faithfully drawn from a real, recent IBRiS poll, and its main empirical point — that most Poles do not fear an imminent Russian invasion — is supported. The verdict is mostly true because the post generalizes a narrow question about fear of attack into disbelief in the "Russian threat," injects an unsupported claim about a coordinated media campaign, and omits the roughly quarter of respondents who do see an attack as possible.
